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Introduction
How has the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (also 
known as IS, ISIS, or ISIL) managed to take over such a 
large swath of territory in the Middle East? The answer to 
this question is fundamental not only to understanding this 
group’s recent sensational success in Iraq and Syria, but also 
to identifying strategies to defeat it. 
The Islamic State’s success can be attributed in large part 
to sectarian violence and oppression in these two states. In 
Syria, demonstrations in favor of democratic governance 
devolved into a civil war that, in the context of a minori-
ty-Shia government ruling a majority-Sunni population, 
quickly took on sectarian contours. In Iraq, the Shia-dom-
inated government systematically oppressed the Sunni mi-
nority, generating frustration and anger among the latter. 
Fundamentally, the Islamic State capitalized on existing 
frustrations, sectarian violence, and oppression in these two 
states to develop and expand its power in the region. 
Islam’s Schism
There are 1.6 billion Muslims in the world today, divided 
into two primary sects: Sunni Islam and Shia Islam. Sun-
ni means follower of the sunna, or “way” in Arabic, of the 
Prophet Mohammed. Sunnis are opposed to political suc-
cession of caliphs based on Mohammed’s bloodline. The 
word Shia is a term that stems from shi’atu Ali, Arabic for 
“partisans of Ali”. Shias believe that only Mohammed’s de-
scendants should be caliphs because they are part of a divine 
order. Sunnism is Islam’s dominant sect, making up 85% of 
the world’s Muslim population while the Shia compose the 
remaining 15%. Ultimately, Shia identity is rooted in vic-
timhood due to the killing of the Prophet Mohammed’s 
grandson, Husayn. Iraq, with a Shia-majority population, is 
currently under a Shia-dominated government. The Assad 
family, who is Shia, has led Syria even though the majori-
ty of the population is Sunni. Over the past several years, 
violence between Sunnis and Shias has been increasing in 
these two countries. Shia Muslims usually view Sunnis with 
suspicion and extremist Sunnis believe Shias are heretics and 
apostates.
Iraq Under Maliki 
With the fall of Saddam Hussein’s government in 2003, the 
Shia majority (consisting of 60-65% of Iraq’s population of 24 
million) began to assert a predominant role in government 
after decades of suppression and torture under Hussein’s Sun-
ni rule. In April 2006 Nouri al-Maliki (a Shia) was appointed 
prime minister but found it difficult to govern because the 
position lacked the power and coherent institutions needed 
to rule. Over the next several years, however, his rule became 
increasingly authoritarian as he increased his power through 
the creation of the “Malikiyoun” (a cohesive group of officials 
with close personal ties to Maliki)and the use of Iraq’s securi-
ty services to protect him personally and politically.  
Sunni-majority provinces feared the rise of an autocratic 
Shia-led government and under Maliki’s rule, Iraq’s Sunni 
minority has been marginalized and sectarian violence has 
increased. In December 2011 Maliki exiled Vice President 
Tariq al-Hashemi, a Sunni. The government detained and 
severely tortured three of his bodyguards until they made 
dramatic confessions on national television denouncing the 
Vice President for paying them to commit assassinations and 
bombings. It was apparent that extreme torture was used to 
extract these “confessions” and one of the bodyguards died in 
custody. Maliki also arrested the Vice President’s Sunni Dep-
uty Prime Minister, Rafi al-Issawi. Ayad Allawi, head of the 
Iraqiya coalition of which al-Hashemi and al-Issawi were se-
nior members, wrote, “The country is slipping back into the 
clutches of a dangerous new one-man rule, which inevitably 
will lead to full dictatorship.” In February 2011, December 
2011 and 2012, and January 2013 Maliki used Iraq Special 
Operations Forces to strike down and immobilize political 
opposition protest movements. This only resulted in the fur-
ther fracture of Iraqi society. Maliki’s rule was characterized 
by the increasing sectarian polarization as his Shia-dominat-
ed government systematically removed Sunni officials from 
office and arrested hundreds of Sunnis in response to bomb-
ings of Shia neighborhoods.
Syria’s Civil War
The Assad regime has ruled Syria since 1970. The Assad fam-
ily is Alawite, a heterodox sect of Shia that makes up 13% of 
the Syrian population. During the 2011 Arab Spring, Syrians 
took to the streets in protest of their government and called 
for the institutionalization of democratic ideals rather than 
an authoritarian government riddled with corruption. Assad 
was determined to crush the demonstrations. When he re-
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sponded with force and violent crackdowns, the protestors 
gathered with arms. What began as non-violent protests for 
a more democratic system of governance turned into a civil 
war that has left hundreds of thousands dead, created more 
than 3 million Syrian refugees, and left millions more inter-
nally displaced. 
At the onset, it was thought that extremist groups would 
attempt to exploit the conflict, especially groups such as al 
Qaeda and their regional franchises. Furthermore, a distinct 
divide in affiliation became visible, with Shia groups like 
Hezbollah supporting the regime while Sunni Muslims (in-
cluding al Qaeda) fought with the opposition against the re-
gime. Eastern Syria developed into a sanctuary for extremists 
and foreign fighters aligned with al Qaeda. The open border 
between Iraq and Syria has allowed jihadists to travel freely 
between countries. The al Nusra Front, who was al Qaeda’s 
official franchise in Syria, was seen as a legitimate rebel fight-
er group against the Assad Regime. It was the fastest grow-
ing and most effective opposition group due to its relatively 
easy access to supplies and resources. There was substantial 
support for al Nusra among the Syrian population because 
of their ability to provide government services in opposi-
tion-held territories. It is important to keep in mind, how-
ever, that many fighters in Syria have been fundamentally 
Syrian nationalists.
Rise of the Islamic State
The Islamic State had its beginnings as al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI, 
an al Qaeda affiliate) and the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). In 
2010, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, became the leader of AQI. Al 
Qaeda in Iraq was a group of puritanical Sunni militants 
who plagued Iraq with suicide bombings, beheadings, and 
kidnappings that targeted both Shia and Sunni Muslims. It 
pursued a unified Islamic nation that believed Shias were 
apostates who must be fought. AQI’s goals included waging 
“jihad in the cause of God in order to exalt his word, liber-
ate all Muslim  territories from infidels and apostates [Shias], 
and establish sharia law in these territories,” as well as estab-
lishing “a wise caliphate similar to the theocracy established 
by the Prophet Mohammed.” 
In April 2013, al-Baghdadi expanded into Syria, a move very 
much in keeping with traditional al Qaeda patterns of mov-
ing into conflicts where they claim to support the opposition. 
They use their resources to gain new recruits and radicalize 
the opposition to create a strong presence within the coun-
try. However, the decision also brought him into conflict 
with al Qaeda, as entering Syria meant Baghdadi encroached 
on al Nusra’s (another al Qaeda affiliate) turf. Ayman al-Za-
wahiri, leader of al Qaeda since the death of bin Laden, ulti-
mately disavowed al-Baghdadi over his refusal to adhere to 
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demands he return to Iraq (as well as his divisively brutal 
methods). Al-Baghdadi went on to declare that the two al 
Qaeda groups would merge under a single name: the Islam-
ic State of Iraq and al-Sham (translated as “the Levant” or 
“Greater Syria”), or ISIS. 
The Islamic State made significant military and territori-
al gains despite being disavowed by al Qaeda in February 
of 2014. The territory that ISIS carved out of Iraq and Syr-
ia allowed them to create a haven for training recruits and 
planning attacks. For recruitment, ISIS has drawn from the 
pool of foreign fighters already in Syria fighting for jihad. 
In June 2014, they captured Iraq’s second largest city, Mo-
sul. The speed with which ISIS has taken territory suggests 
that it has been cooperating with Sunnis who were faithful 
to Saddam Hussein and who continued to fight against Ma-
liki’s Shia-dominated government. In July 2014, Baghda-
dideclared himself the caliph of his new Islamic State. The 
last Islamic caliphate to exist was dissolved by the modern-
ist reformer Atatürk in 1924 with the founding of the mod-
ern Turkish Republic. Much of the Muslim world came to 
recognize that the continuation and revival of the caliphate 
was not a realistic prospect due to the 
shifting world order. They believed the 
moral system of Islam could be real-
ized within the confines of the nation 
state. The Islamic State, however, does 
not believe this. Since its beginnings 
as AQI, its goal has been to establish 
a caliphate; its main objectives are to 
“spread monotheism on earth, cleanse 
it of polytheism, to govern according 
to the law of God, [and] to repulse the 
aggressors.”
The violence al-Baghdadi carried out 
in Iraq under ISIS has become even 
more prevalent under the black ban-
ner of the Islamic State. ISIS conducts 
savage beheadings and executions of 
captured soldiers and men in con-
quered towns and villages. Christians and Shia Muslims have 
been slaughtered and non-Sunni shrines and places of wor-
ship destroyed. ISIS views women as second-class citizens 
that are to be used for sex and then discarded or sold as slaves 
to other men. Young girls are given as brides to men more 
than twice their age. Women and girls are forced to undergo 
genital mutilation in ISIS-controlled towns.
Because of their brutality and radical interpretation of Islam, 
the Islamic State has little support from the Muslim ummah, 
or community, in the region. Al Qaeda affiliates in Yemen, 
the mainstream Sunni religious community, including Cai-
ro’s al Azhar seminary, and Yussuf al Qaradawi, an Egyptian 
cleric who serves as a spiritual leader of the Muslim Broth-
erhood, represent just a few of the many Muslims who have 
denounced the Islamic State. 
Conclusion
President Obama has vowed that the U.S. will “degrade and 
ultimately destroy” the Islamic State because it hreatens 
American interests in the Middle East, as well as national 
security at home. However, in September 2014, President 
Obama and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry implied that 
local and regional actors would be expected to play an im-
portant role in the defeat of ISIS by engaging in ground com-
bat operations while the U.S. focused on providing logistical 
support and training for Iraqi forces. Looking ahead, ad-
dressing the immediate security and human rights concerns 
of the people living under ISIS control is a key objective for 
the U.S. and its allies. At the same time, however, identifying 
tools, structures, and programs to address the underlying
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Free Syrian Army (FSA) soldiers hold a planning 
session during the Battle of Aleppo, Oct. 2012
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sources of the Islamic State’s success will be paramount to 
ensuring long-term security, stability, and ultimately pros-
perity. A solution to the challenge of the Islamic State is not 
currently evident, and may not even be possible, but that 
does not mean the world should not attempt to at least man-
age the problem of extremist forces waging a civil war in two 
countries. Doing so is in the interest of all humanity.
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